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1 Introduction
Access to higher education has increased substantially over the past two decades.
Between 1995 and 2010, university entry rates rose from 37 to 62 percent on av-
erage across OECD countries. Despite this widening of participation in higher
education, young people with low educated parents are still less than half as
likely to be in higher education compared with their peers in the general pop-
ulation (OECD, 2012). These differences in educational attainment translate
into persistent earnings inequalities.
To lower the financial barriers to post-secondary education for low-income
students, many countries operate broad-based financial aid programs that pro-
vide tuition waivers and cash transfers. These programs are typically need-
based, with awards decreasing in parental income and capped at around 6,000 dol-
lars. Examples of such schemes include the Maintenance Grant in the UK, the
Spanish Becas, the Pell Grant in the US and the French Bourses sur crite`res
sociaux (hereafter BCS). All these programs are nationwide and cover a non-
negligible fraction of the student population – up to a third in the US and in
France.
Despite the central importance of large need-based financial aid programs in
promoting equal access to higher education, and considering the financial stakes
involved, relatively little is known about their effectiveness in improving the
outcomes of low-income students. This paper aims to fill this gap by providing a
comprehensive assessment of France’s single largest need-based grant program.
We take advantage of the existence of sharp discontinuities in the BCS grant
eligibility formula to estimate the impact of financial aid on college enrollment,
persistence and degree completion rates for low-income students.
The assessment of need-based grant programs requires going beyond eval-
uating their impact on college enrollment decisions, since the ability of such
programs to improve the educational and labor market outcomes of low-income
students ultimately depends on how they affect persistence and degree at-
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tainment. Standard models of human capital investment with borrowing con-
straints predict that the provision of financial support should increase initial
enrollment rates by lowering the cost of college.1 The enrollment effects of
need-based grants are therefore entirely determined by the behavior of the
“marginal” students, i.e., of those who would not have attended college with-
out financial support. In contrast, their impact on persistence and degree com-
pletion rates depends on the behavioral responses of both the “marginal” and
the “inframarginal” students, the latter group referring to students who would
have attended college irrespective of their eligibility for a grant. If marginal
students are of substantially lower average ability than inframarginal students,
then need-based grants might have only a weak impact on persistence and
degree completion rates. The provision of financial support could, however,
improve the learning conditions of all students by allowing them to work less,
to be more focused on their studies and to eventually complete a degree.2 Be-
cause the combined effect of these “extensive” and “intensive” margin responses
is uncertain, the overall impact of financial assistance programs on student per-
sistence and degree attainment is fundamentally an empirical question.
The literature on student aid provides relatively little direct empirical evi-
dence on the impact of large need-based programs on college access and success
for low-income students. Most of the existing work focuses on more narrowly
defined programs, which have been implemented in the US for specific groups
of students and/or are operated at the level of a particular state or university.
Examples of such programs include the Veterans’ educational benefits (An-
grist, 1993; Stanley, 2003; Bound and Turner, 2002, 2003), the Social Security
Student Benefit Program (Dynarski, 2003) and a variety of state merit-based
1The importance of college costs in students’ educational choices is further emphasized in
models that take into account the role of risk aversion in the demand for education (Brodaty
et al., 2012).
2Many students are constrained to work to fund their studies, which can have adverse
effects on their college attainment. In France, over 20 percent of students work on a regular
basis during the academic year (OVE, 2011) and recent empirical evidence suggests that
holding a regular part-time job has large detrimental effects on the probability of graduating
from college (Beffy et al., 2013).
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programs targeted at students who meet certain academic requirements,3 or at
students who are already in college (Angrist et al., 2009; Goldrick-Rab et al.,
2012), as well as state need-based grant programs which supplement federal
aid (Castleman and Long, 2012). To overcome the identification issues that
arise when estimating the impact of financial aid on student outcomes, the
standard practice has been to use policy changes and eligibility rules as sources
of exogenous variation to identify the parameters of interest. Most of the above
studies find that the provision of financial support has a positive impact on the
targeted groups’ college enrollment decisions and a few papers also find posi-
tive effects on college attainment. It is, however, unclear whether these results
would apply to broader need-based grant programs, which typically serve larger
populations and are only awarded on the basis of students’ financial need.
In contrast to this vast body of research, the available evidence on the effects
of large-scale need-based programs appears both limited and mixed. A number
of authors have investigated the effects of the aforementioned Pell Grants, with
a specific focus on initial enrollment decisions and choices amongst colleges.
Overall, existing studies find no clear and persuasive evidence that Pell Grants
significantly impact college access for the marginal, low-income students.4 To
our knowledge, Bettinger (2004) is the only paper to examine the effect of Pell
Grants on student persistence between the first and second year of college,
using discontinuities in the eligibility formula.5 His estimates suggest that
3Studies include Dynarski (2000, 2008), Abraham and Clark (2006), Cornwell et al. (2006),
Kane (2007), Goodman (2008). For a review, see Deming and Dynarski (2010).
4For a review of empirical studies on the Pell Grant program, see Kane (2006), Deming
and Dynarski (2010), and also Kane (1995) and Seftor and Turner (2002). Some studies have
explored specifically the complexity of the Pell Grant Program (Dynarski and Wiederspan,
2012; Dynarski and Scott Clayton, 2008; Bettinger et al., 2012) and its inflationary effect
on tuition fees (Goldin and Cellini, 2012; Turner, 2012) as potential explanations for its
limited impact on college enrollment. In the French context analyzed in this paper, such a
phenomenon is unlikely to occur since most higher education institutions are not free to set
their own tuition fees.
5Castleman and Long (2012) also use discontinuities to evaluate the impact of grants on
degree completion rates, but they consider a program (the Florida Student Access Grant)
which supplements Pell Grants. They estimate the effects of this additional subsidy on
student outcomes but not the impact of the initial Pell Grant (i.e., of some aid versus no
aid).
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Pell Grants tend to reduce dropout rates but the findings are not completely
robust to specification. Empirical evidence on the impact of need-based grant
programs outside of the US is even more limited and mixed.6 In these latter
studies, the reliance on indirect sources rather than on direct administrative
data on grant applicants has typically prevented researchers from exploiting
small variations in grant eligibility formulas to identify the programs’ effects
on student outcomes.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on student finan-
cial aid. First, we are able to link administrative micro-data on the universe
of students applying for need-based grants in French higher education over the
period 2008-2010 with data on all students enrolled in French public univer-
sities. These administrative data allow us to exploit sharp discontinuities in
the assessment formula to estimate the impact of grant eligibility on student
outcomes without having to be concerned about student mobility across institu-
tions. Second, our analysis takes advantage of the fact that grant applications
have to be renewed every year to estimate the effect of financial aid on appli-
cants’ decisions at each level of study, i.e. for those entering college as well as for
those who are already enrolled in higher education. Third, we investigate the
impact of financial aid on a broader set of outcomes than most previous studies
have been able to examine, analyzing not only college enrollment decisions, but
also persistence and degree completion rates.
We find that being eligible for a cash allowance of 1,500 euros per year
increases college enrollment or re-enrollment rates by up to 5 percentage points.
Moreover, our estimates show that the effects of need-based grants are not
short-lived since eligibility for the cash allowance has a positive and significant
impact on the persistence rates of prospective undergraduate and graduate
students. The effects on degree completion are more mixed. While being
eligible for an allowance of 1,500 euros is not found to significantly increase the
6See Nielsen et al. (2010) for the Netherlands; Steiner et al. (2006; 2011) for Germany;
Dearden et al. (2011) for the UK.
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probability of graduating on time for college entrants, our estimates point out
to positive and significant degree completion effects for continuing students, of
5 percentage points for prospective master’s students, and of up to 3 percentage
points for students in their final year of an undergraduate or graduate degree
program.
At a time of historic budget shortfalls, the cost-effectiveness of large-scale
financial aid programs is being increasingly questioned. We interpret our find-
ings as evidence that such programs can improve the educational outcomes of
low-income students, both on the extensive margin of college going and on the
intensive margin of academic achievement in university. Our results suggest,
however, that the net social benefits from need-based grant programs are larger
for continuing students than for college entrants.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides some institu-
tional background on French higher education and outlines the main features of
the BCS grant program. Section 3 explains the estimation strategy. Section 4
describes the data. Section 5 discusses the validity of the regression disconti-
nuity design, presents the main results and performs a number of robustness
checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
In this section, we provide a brief overview the French system of higher educa-
tion and detail the costs of college education in France. We next turn to the
description of the main features of the BCS need-based grant program.
2.1 Higher Education and the Cost of College in France
The French system of higher education comprises various institutions, the vast
majority of which are publicly funded.7 After graduating from high school, stu-
7In 2010-2011, private institutions accounted for less than 18 percent of total enrollment
in higher education (MEN, 2013).
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dents willing to engage in post-secondary education can choose between two
main tracks. Out of the of 78 percent of high school graduates who decide
to enter higher education,8 the majority chooses to enroll in public universi-
ties (56 percent), which offer academic and vocational undergraduate degrees
(mainly three-year degrees called Licence), graduate degrees (Master) and doc-
toral degrees. French universities are not selective as the only requirement for
undergraduate admission is to have passed the high school graduation exam
(Baccalaure´at). About a third of the high school graduates who enter higher
education choose instead to enroll in special public high schools which offer two
types of courses: academically-oriented courses preparing for admission to elite
graduate schools (Classes Pre´paratoires aux Grandes E´coles) or professionally-
oriented courses leading to advanced vocational degrees (Sections de Technicien
Supe´rieur). Admission to either type of course is selective as there are only a
limited number of seats available for each program. Outside of these two main
tracks, a minority of high school graduates choose to enroll in specialized public
or private higher education institutions that lead to specific degree programs
(such as schools of art, architecture, journalism, etc.).
In France, the costs of post-secondary education are mainly driven by living
expenses, since tuition fees in public universities are set at a very low level (in
2010, annual tuition fees were 174 euros for undergraduate students and 237 eu-
ros for graduate students). Living costs incurred by students can, however, be
relatively high, as most higher education institutions are located in large cities.
Subsidized university residence halls are in very limited supply and housing
costs in the private sector can be substantial in some areas, even after taking
into account the housing benefits for which most students are eligible if they live
away from home. Recent surveys on students’ social and economic conditions
indicate that on average, college students living away from home spend around
700 euros per month to cover their living expenses. In addition, students have
to pay annual tuition fees and social security contributions (around 200 eu-
8The figures refer to the academic year 2010-2011.
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ros per year). According to our computations, the total average budget for a
nine-month academic year amounts to 6,300 euros, representing a potentially
important barrier to low-income students’ access to higher education.9
2.2 The BCS Need-Based Grant Program
The Bourses sur Crite`res Sociaux program is France’s national financial sup-
port scheme for low-income students at the post-secondary level. About a third
of students enrolled in higher education receive a BCS grant, for a total cost
of 1.7 billion euros in 2010. Other forms of financial support, such as State
guaranteed student loans or merit-based grants, which exist on a large scale in
many countries, are almost non-existent in France.10
The amount of financial aid awarded through the BCS program depends
on applicants’ parental taxable income and a composite score which takes into
account their number of siblings and the distance between their parents’ home
and the university they plan to attend. The program consists of seven levels
of grants (referred to as e´chelons), which range from 0 to 6. Students who
qualify for a level 0 grant are exempt from paying tuition fees (if they attend
a public university) and social security contributions, but are not eligible for
cash benefits. In addition to the fee waivers, students who qualify for a level 1
grant receive an annual cash allowance of approximately 1,500 euros, which we
estimate to cover a third of the average living expenses of eligible students who
live away from home.11 This annual allowance increases by smaller increments
at each of the higher levels of grant (the average increment being 600 euros)
up to a maximum of 4,200 euros per year for a level 6 grant, which would
9The details of the calculations are provided in the paper’s online appendix
(www.parisschoolofeconomics.com/grenet-julien/Articles/FackGrenet2013appendix.pdf)
10A program of State guaranteed loans was introduced in 2008 but with very limited
success, since less than 0.3 percent of students in higher education contracted such loans
over the first three years of the program. Publicly provided merit-based grants exist but
are awarded each year to less than 1,000 undergraduate and graduate students who already
qualify for need-based grants.
11See the online appendix for details on the calculation of the share of living expenses
covered by the different levels of BCS grant.
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cover 90 percent of the eligible student’s average living expenses. The amounts
awarded through the BCS program can therefore be regarded as significantly
reducing the cost of college education for low-income students.
Our estimation strategy takes advantage of the multiple discontinuities that
are created by the grant eligibility formula to estimate the impact of qualify-
ing for different levels of grant on applicants’ outcomes. We detail below the
program’s eligibility rules and review the application process, emphasizing the
features which limit the applicants’ ability to manipulate the assignment vari-
ables around the eligibility thresholds.
2.2.1 Eligibility Rules
Eligibility to a BCS grant is conditional on applying for a full-time degree
program at a French higher education institution and on being under 29 years
of age at the time of application.12 The level of grant to which applicants are
entitled is a deterministic function of their parental income and of a discrete-
valued family needs assessment (FNA) score called points de charge. Parental
income is the taxable income that appears on the tax notice that the applicant’s
parents received in the year preceding the application and corresponds to the
amount of taxable income that they earned two years before.13 During the
period covered by our analysis (2008 to 2010), the FNA score was computed
on the basis of two criteria: i) number of siblings and ii) distance to university.14
Each sibling counts for four points if he/she registered in higher education at
the time of application and for two points otherwise. Extra points are awarded
to applicants whose parents’ home is located more than 30 km away from the
chosen university, one point up to 249 km and two points beyond. The points
12Eligibility rules are detailed in the Circulaire 2009-1018 du 2-7-2009, Bulletin officiel de
l’Education Nationale no 30 du 23 juillet 2009.
13When parents are divorced or single, applicants are requested to report the taxable
income of the custodial parent’s household.
14In 2008, the French ministry of Higher Education decided to no longer take into account
other criteria that were previously used in the computation of the FNA score (such as single
parent status or student disability).
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for siblings and distance to university are added together to compute the FNA
score, which is capped at 17 points. The median score among applicants is
3 points.
The parental income thresholds that determine eligibility to the different
levels of grant depend on the applicant’s FNA score, generating multiple discon-
tinuities. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the full set of income
eligibility thresholds that were used in the 2009 round of applications, whereas
Figure 2 shows the amount of cash allowance for which a 2009 applicant with an
FNA score of 3 points would qualify depending on her parental income. This
applicant would not be eligible for any level of grant if her parental income
was above 46,145 euros, placing her family in the top quintile of the income
distribution of household income in France.15 To be entitled to the highest
level of grant (level 6), her parental income would need to be below 10,509 eu-
ros, which corresponds approximately to the bottom quintile of the household
income distribution.
As most large-scale need-based grant programs around the world, the BCS
scheme awards grants on a yearly basis. Grants can be renewed up to seven
times but students are required to file a new application every year, their
parental income and FNA score being reassessed each time. In addition, grant
renewal is subject to minimum academic achievement requirements. Grant
recipients loose their right to a grant if they fail to obtain 60 credits (which
is the number of credits obtained in a typical university year) two years in a
row. In other words, grant renewal is suspended after two consecutive failures
in a given year level. Eligible students are also required to comply with the
attendance requirements set by their university and to take all of the exams.
Failure to meet these requirements may lead to the repayment of the allowance
received by the student.16
15Source: authors’ calculations based on the Enqueˆte Revenus Fiscaux et Sociaux 2008.
All amounts are expressed in 2011 euros.
16Unfortunately, the extent to which these regulations are enforced in practice cannot be
measured from our data. This is because the exact reason for why certain applicants are
denied a conditional grant despite being eligible on the basis of their parental income and
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2.2.2 Application Process
The grant application process for students who are planning to enroll or to re-
enroll in a higher education institution begins in the January preceding the start
of the academic year and spans over several months. Individual applications
are processed by the regional branches of the national student service agency
(CNOUS). The main application steps can be summarized as follows.
(i) Official online application round (January 15 – April 30). Students ap-
ply jointly for need-based grants and student housing (optional) on a dedicated
website.17 They can submit up to four pre-registration applications, as they
may not yet have made a definitive choice regarding the institution or degree
program that they plan to attend at the start of the next academic year.
(ii) Processing of applications (May 1 – Mid-July). Individuals applications
are processed by the local branch of the student service agency upon reception
of all supporting documents. The grant schedule is updated in early July,
after which applicants receive a conditional grant notification, which indicates
the level of grant for which they can qualify for each of their pre-registration
choices.
(iii) University registration and payment of cash allowance (Mid-July on-
wards). The academic enrollment process begins in mid-July and lasts until the
end of September. Upon proof of registration, grant recipients start receiving
the first of their nine monthly payments in October and receive the final grant
payment in June of the following year.
Two key features of the BCS program limit the applicants’ ability to ma-
nipulate the information provided to the student service agency in order to
qualify for higher levels of grants than they would normally be entitled to.
First, the exact values of the income thresholds that determine the amount of
financial support for a given FNA score are unknown to candidates when they
FNA score is not specified. These grounds include not only the non-compliance with the
minimum academic achievement requirements but also the withdrawal of some applications
or the failure to send all the supporting documents to the student service agency.
17https://dse.orion.education.fr/depot/.
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submit their application. To get a rough idea of the amount of grant for which
they would qualify, they can rely on an online simulator which is based on the
current year thresholds18, and not on the actual schedule that will be used to
assess their eligibility. The income thresholds are updated in early July and
their new values cannot be precisely inferred from the previous ones, since the
adjustment usually goes beyond the inflation factor. The ability to predict the
values of the new thresholds is further complicated by the fact that the on-
line simulator does not explicitly provide the values of the current thresholds,
but computes instead the amount of grant based on the user’s stated parental
income and FNA score. In light of these practical aspects of the application
process, it seems unlikely that applicants would have sufficient knowledge to
accurately predict how far away they will be from the new thresholds.
The second key obstacle to manipulating the information that enters the
financial aid award formula is that applicants are required to submit all sup-
porting documents for their grant application. The only admissible proof of
parental income is a paper copy of the applicant’s parents’ tax notice, which
they received in the year immediately preceding the application. The tax notice
is also used to determine the number of dependent children in the applicant’s
family. The points awarded for siblings enrolled in post-secondary education
at the time of application are conditional on the submission of their university
enrollment certificates. Finally, the distance between the parents’ home ad-
dress (as shown on the tax notice) and the chosen university is computed by
the student service agency’s geolocation tool.
Not only is the scope for manipulation of the grant eligibility criteria limited,
but it is also very unlikely that the updated income thresholds would influence
the decision of whether or not apply for a grant, since these thresholds are
unknown until applications have been fully processed. Moreover, it should be
18http://www.cnous.fr/ vie dossier 264.757.265.htm. Users of this online simulator are
informed that changes in the grant schedule can affect the level of grant to which they will
ultimately be entitled. They are further advised that they should apply for a grant even if
they are uncertain about their eligibility.
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noted that students have an incentive to submit an application even if their
parental income falls above most of the thresholds set by the BCS schedule,
because they would remain eligible for some form of financial support. Indeed,
all students who qualify for a grant of level 0 or above are at least eligible for
fee waivers. It is therefore in their interest to file an application even if they
do not qualify for the annual cash allowance. The only income thresholds that
are associated with a clear change in incentives to submit an application are
those that determine eligibility for a level 0 grant as opposed to no grant a
all. Around these thresholds, the number of applications can be expected to
decrease rapidly as a function of parental income. However, as long as students
cannot predict the exact location of the new thresholds, this decreasing pattern
should be continuous. This issue will be examined in more detail in section 5.1.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis is based on linked individual-level administrative data that allow
us to track the enrollment decisions and academic progress of all prospective
college students who filed an application for a BCS grant.
We combine three main administrative data sources, which were provided to
us by the Statistical office of the French ministry of Higher Education (MESR-
DGESIP) and were matched using an encrypted student identifier: (i) AGLAE,
which covers the universe of applicants to BCS grants over the period 2008 to
2010; (ii) SISE, which includes all students enrolled in public universities in
academic years 2008-2009 through 2010-2011; and (iii) OCEAN, which provides
the high school graduation exam (Baccalaure´at) scores of all high school seniors
between 2003 and 2010.
The AGLAE data contain basic information on the socio-demographic char-
acteristics of BCS grant applicants (gender, age, place of residence, etc.), the
full set of variables that determine grant eligibility (including their parental
income and FNA score), the amounts of conditional and final grant awarded
12
as well as the degree program attended by the student (for grant recipients
only). The SISE dataset covers approximately two thirds of students enrolled
in higher education (i.e., all students attending academic or vocational courses
in publics universities), and contain basic information on the socio-demographic
characteristics of students, detailed information on the university, name and
year level of the degree program they attend, and a binary variable indicating
whether they successfully completed the degree. For the academic year 2010-
2011, we supplement the SISE data with an extract of the Base Centrale de
Scolarite´, which includes the universe of undergraduate students enrolled in
selective post-secondary vocational education or in preparatory classes to elite
schools. Finally, we use the OCEAN data ro retrieve individual-level infor-
mation about the high school graduation results of applicants to BCS grants,
which are converted into percentile ranks for each cohort of high school seniors.
In order to be able to track the college enrollment decisions of BCS grant
applicants, we restrict our sample to applicants who listed an undergraduate
or a graduate college degree program for each of their pre-registration choices
(62 percent of all applicants) and who submitted their application before July,
i.e., before the update of the income thresholds19. We further exclude from the
sample high school applicants who ended up being ineligible for a BCS grant
because they failed to pass the Baccalaure´at exam. Finally, we drop the small
fraction of applicants (13 percent) whose FNA score varies across their pre-
registration choices through the points awarded under the distance to university
criterion, to avoid the complexities induced by the fact these applicants can be
eligible for different levels of grant across their different choices.20
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics on our sample of BCS grant
applicants, which we split into three groups: i) The “L0/No grant cutoffs”
sample (column 1) includes applicants whose parental income is close to the
eligibility thresholds between no grant and a level 0 grant (fee waivers only);
19Although some late applications are accepted by the student service agency, they repre-
sent less than 14 percent of all applications.
20In practice, including these applicants yields similar results.
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ii) the “L1/L0 cutoffs” sample (column 2) includes applicants in the vicinity
of the income thresholds between level 0 and level 1 grants, where students
become eligible for an additional cash allowance of 1,500 euros per annum;
iii) the “L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs” sample (column 3) pools applicants who are
close to the income thresholds between two consecutive levels of grant in the
level 2 to level 6 range, where the amount of annual cash allowance increases
by 600 euros on average. The table shows that with an average Baccalaure´at
percentile rank of about 60, BCS grant applicants tend to be of higher academic
ability than the average high school senior in their cohort. The high proportion
of female applicants (around 60 percent) reflects the fact that in France, female
students are both more likely to enter higher education and to attend non-
selective colleges than males. Approximately 75 percent of applicants in our
sample are prospective first to third year undergraduate students while the
remaining 25 percent are prospective first or second year master’s students.
By construction, the average parental income of applicants in the “L6/L5 to
L2/L1 cutoffs” sample (21,669 euros) is lower than that of applicants in the
other two samples (31,632 euros for the L0/L1 sample and 42,068 euros for the
L0/no grant sample). They also tend to have more siblings, which explains
their higher FNA score.
4 Empirical Strategy
We use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of need-based
grants on applicants’ higher education outcomes. Our approach takes advan-
tage of the existence of sizable discontinuities in the amount of financial aid
that applicants can receive depending on their parental income and FNA score.
Our goal is to estimate the causal effect of being eligible for a need-based
grant on the outcomes of applicants:
yi = α + β.Gi + ui (1)
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where yi is the outcome of interest for applicant i (e.g., being enrolled in col-
lege), Gi is a dummy variable equal to one if the applicant is eligible for a
need-based grant and zero otherwise, and ui is the unobservable error term. A
simple OLS regression of equation (1) would yield a biased estimate of β be-
cause grant eligibility is partly determined by parental income, and therefore
endogenous. Even after controlling for family income, OLS estimates could be
biased due to the endogenous selection of applicants. Since not all eligible in-
dividuals participate in the program, the decision to apply for a grant is likely
to be correlated with unobservable characteristics that affect the outcomes of
interest.
In order to identify the treatment effect of being entitled to a grant, we
exploit the fact that the BCS grant eligibility formula creates discontinuities
in the amount of financial aid awarded to applicants. The intuition behind
our empirical strategy is the following. Since the income thresholds between
different levels of grant are exogenously given, and assuming that the infor-
mation provided to the national student service agency cannot be precisely
manipulated by applicants, we can focus on applicants who are in the vicinity
of a threshold, and consider that those just below are very similar to those
just above. The amount of aid for which these applicants qualify can therefore
be considered as locally randomly assigned. Under the additional assumption
that, in the absence of treatment, the outcome of interest is a smooth function
of parental income, the causal effect of grant eligibility is identified by compar-
ing the average outcome of applicants immediately below the income thresholds
(treatment group) with that of applicants immediately above (control group).
Let Ti,k denote a dummy variable which takes the value one if applicant i
is eligible for a grant of level k (0 6 k 6 6). For expositional simplicity and
without loss of generality, we define eligibility for a level k grant as eligibility
for all level of grants up to k, i.e., Ti,k = 1⇒ Ti,k′ = 1 ∀ k′ < k.
Eligibility for a level k grant is a function of the applicant’s parental in-
come zi and FNA score si:
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Ti,k = 1{zi 6 zk(si)} (2)
where 1{.} is the indicator function and zk(si) is a deterministic function that
returns the income eligibility threshold for a level k grant when the applicant’s
score is si.
The amount of conditional aid Ai awarded to applicant i can be defined as
the sum of the allowance increments ak for which the applicant qualifies over
all possible levels of grant:
Ai =
6∑
k=0
akTi,k (3)
We model the relationship between grant eligibility and the outcomes of
interest using the following reduced-form equation:
yi = α +
6∑
k=0
βkTi,k + i (4)
In equation (4), the parameters βk are the treatment effects of switching
the applicant’s eligibility status from a level k − 1 grant to a level k grant:
βk = E(yi|Ti,k = 1)− E(yi|Ti,k−1 = 1) (5)
Under the assumption that the conditional mean function E(|z, s) is con-
tinuous in parental income z at the income eligibility threshold zk(s), the treat-
ment effect βk will be identified by the difference:
lim
s↑zk(s)
E(y|z, s)− lim
s↓zk(s)
E(y|z, s) (6)
A specific feature of the BCS grant eligibility formula is that it generates a
large number of discontinuity points, which vary with the FNA score and the
level of grant considered. As can be seen in figure 1, there are in total 126
different income eligibility thresholds (7 grant level thresholds for each of the
18 possible values taken by the FNA score). Due to sample size limitations,
separate estimations at each income threshold would yield very imprecise esti-
mates. We choose instead to pool the eligibility thresholds to construct three
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distinct treatment samples. Our estimates are therefore not limited to appli-
cants in the neighborhood of a single discontinuity but are applicable to a more
general population.
(i) The first sample (referred to as the “L0/No grant cutoffs”) pools the 18
income thresholds that determine eligibility to a level 0 grant as opposed to no
grant at all. At these thresholds, we identify the treatment effect β0 of being
eligible for fee waivers on the outcomes of applicants.
(ii) The second sample (“L1/L0 cutoffs”) pools the 18 income thresholds
between level 1 and level 0 grants. At these thresholds, we identify the treat-
ment effect β1 of being eligible for an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros, for
applicants who already qualify for the fee waivers.
(iii) Our third treatment sample (“L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs”) pools the 90
income thresholds between consecutive levels of grant ranging from level 2 to
level 6. At these thresholds, the treatment effect is a weighted average of the
treatment effects β2 to β6, i.e., the effect of being eligible for an incremental
annual allowance of approximately 600 euros, with weights equal to the fraction
of applicants around each threshold.
Alternative estimation methods have been proposed to implement equa-
tion (6). In this study, we apply both a parametric approach based on a split
polynomial approximation (Lee, 2008) and a non-parametric approach based
on local linear regression (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
The split polynomial approximation uses all available observations at a
given threshold z and chooses a flexible polynomial specification to fit the rela-
tionship between the outcome yi and the forcing variable zi (parental income)
on either side of the cutoff. The treatment effect is estimated as the disconti-
nuity at the cutoff. Specifically, we estimate the following model using OLS:
yi = α + β.Ti +
p∑
s=1
δs.(z
∗
i )
s + Ti
p∑
s=1
γs.(z
∗
i )
s + i (7)
where Ti is a treatment dummy equal to one if zi 6 z, p is the order of the
polynomial function and z∗i = (zi − z)/z is the relative distance between the
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applicant’s parental income and the eligibility threshold z. The parameter of
interest β measures the jump between the two regression lines at the thresh-
old z. In our empirical specifications, we use third-order polynomials for the
full samples and second-order polynomials when we consider subsamples.21 Our
sensitivity analysis shows that our baseline results are robust to varying the
order of the polynomial function.
A possible concern with the approach described above is that it may be
sensitive to outcome values for observations far away from the cutoffs (Imbens
and Lemieux, 2008). The second method avoids this problem by fitting linear
regression functions to the observations distributed within a bandwidth h on
either side of the income thresholds. We restrict the sample to applicants
whose parental income z∗i (relative to the cutoff) is in the interval [−h,+h] and
estimate the following model using OLS:
yi = α + β.Ti + δ.z
∗
i + γ.Ti.z
∗
i + i (8)
where observations are weighted according to a triangular (edge) kernel. We
select the optimal bandwidth h∗ for each regression using the method proposed
by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). To assess the sensitivity of our main
estimates to the choice of h∗, we report in the robustness checks section the
results obtained with bandwidths set to half and twice the size of the optimal
bandwidth.
5 Results
In this section, we assess the internal validity of the regression discontinuity
design in the context of our study before discussing the reduced-form effets of
21The samples used in the estimations are restricted to be symmetric around each cutoff
and we selected the size of the relative income-distance to cutoff window to ensure that
observations located on either side of each cutoff do not cross the previous and next income
thresholds for a given FNA score. We further restricted the income intervals around the
pooled L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs to be non-overlapping, in order to avoid using the same
observation on both sides of the cutoffs.
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BCS grant eligibility on college enrollment, persistence and degree completion.
5.1 Validity of the Research Design
A key condition for an RD design to produce unbiased estimates of the treat-
ment under consideration is that there is no systematic manipulation of the
forcing variable around the cutoffs. In section 2.2.2, we argued that the grant
application process minimizes the scope for manipulation of the parental in-
come and FNA score, as the updated income thresholds are not known to
applicants when they file their application. In this section, we formally test
for the absence of manipulation of the forcing variables by showing that the
distribution of parental income does not exhibit discontinuities at the eligibility
thresholds and that the observable characteristics of applicants are balanced at
the cutoffs.
To check for the absence of manipulation of the forcing variables, we start
by examining whether the density of parental income is continuous at the eli-
gibility cutoffs using the test developed by McCrary (2008). This test, which
is performed for each treatment sample separately, consists of running kernel
local linear regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of the
thresholds. The graphical evidence (Figure 3) suggests that although the num-
ber of applicants tends to decrease with parental income around the L1/L0 and
the L0/No grant cutoffs, the density of parental income is continuous. This is
confirmed in Table 2, which shows that regardless of the treatment sample and
year considered, the McCrary test statistic fails to reject the null hypothesis
that the log difference in height around the discontinuity points is equal to
zero. These result suggest that the probability of submitting an application
does not change discontinuously at the income thresholds and that applicants
immediately above the cutoffs are unable to manipulate their FNA score or
parental income to qualify for a higher level of financial aid.
An alternative approach for testing the internal validity of the RD design is
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to check whether the observable characteristics of applicants are “locally” bal-
anced on either side of the cutoffs. If there was non-random sorting, we could
expect some of these characteristics to differ systematically between applicants
immediately above and immediately below a given income threshold. For this
purpose, we use the information available on the characteristics of applicants,
which includes their gender, age, Baccalaure´at percentile rank, parental in-
come, FNA score, number of pre-registration choices, whether they applied
for accommodation in a subsidized university residence hall and whether their
housing application was successful.22 We further test for the potential ma-
nipulation of parental income and FNA score in current applications by using
the information that returning applicants (i.e., 2009 or 2010 applicants who
filed an application in 2008 and 2009, respectively) provided in their previous
application.
The balance tests are performed by replacing the dependent variable in
equations (7) and (8) with each of the observed covariates. Separate paramet-
ric and non-parametric RD estimates are reported for the three treatments in
table 3 (covariates of the current year) and table 4 (covariates of the previous
year). The results indicate that the observable characteristics of applicants are
well balanced on both sides of the cutoffs, since less than 10 percent of the coef-
ficients are significant at the 10 percent level. Furthermore, a chi-squared test
based on a system of seemingly unrelated regression with as many equations as
baseline covariates cannot reject the null hypothesis that the discontinuity gaps
are jointly equal to zero (see the bottom line in each table). Interestingly, the
parental income and FNA score that were recorded in the previous application
of returning 2009 and 2010 applicants show no significant jumps at the current
22Note that contrary to grant eligibility, the allocation of university accommodation is not
determined by reference to income thresholds. If the demand for a particular hall of residence
exceeds the number of available rooms, students are ranked by order of priority based on a
“social index” which is computed as the ratio between their parental income and their FNA
score plus one. The admission cutoffs therefore vary from one hall of residence to another
and there is no reason to expect the probability of being offered student accommodation to
change discontinuously at the income thresholds between the different levels of grant. The
results of the balancing tests confirm this analysis.
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year thresholds. This finding is consistent with the assumption that there is
no manipulative sorting around the income cutoffs.23
The empirical evidence discussed so far supports the internal validity of
the regression discontinuity design to evaluate the impact of BCS grants on
applicants’ outcomes. The next sections present our main results.
5.1.1 Discontinuities in the Amount of Conditional Grant Awarded
For our identification strategy to yield causal estimates of the impact of grant
eligibility on student outcomes, it is important to establish that the amount
of conditional grant awarded to applicants changes discontinuously at the el-
igibility thresholds. For this purpose, we compare the differential amount of
conditional grant awarded by the student service agency to applicants on either
side of the cutoffs with the predicted discontinuities that would result from a
strict application of the grant eligibility formula.
Figure 4 plots, for the different treatment samples, the fraction of applicants
who were awarded a conditional grant (left panels) and the average amount of
cash allowance awarded (right panels) against their relative income-distance to
the thresholds. The graphs in the left panels show that approximately 90 per-
cent of theoretically eligible applicants were awarded a conditional grant. The
remaining 10 percent are either applications that were withdrawn or applica-
tions that were disqualified by the student service agency due to non-compliance
with the minimum academic requirements or because of missing supporting
documents.24 The graphs in the right panels show that the average amount
of cash allowance awarded to applicants exhibits sharp discontinuities at the
income eligibility thresholds and that these discontinuities are of the expected
23Suppose that some applicants are able to falsify their parents’ tax notice to fall below a
given income threshold. In this scenario, incomes below current eligibility thresholds would be
more likely to be undervalued than incomes above. We would therefore expect the previously
declared income to be higher on average for returning applicants below the current income
thresholds than for applicants above.
24Note that the data do not allow us to discriminate between the possible reasons for why
these applications were turned down by the student service agency (see footnote 16).
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magnitude. Importantly, the graphical evidence is not indicative of any sys-
tematic breaching of the assessment formula for applicants marginally above
the thresholds.
The corresponding parametric and non-parametric RD estimates are re-
ported in Table 5 for each treatment sample, together with the mean value of
the dependent variable above the cutoffs. The estimates are almost invariant
across specifications and confirm that the discontinuities in the actual amount
of conditional grant awarded to applicants are very close to the predicted ones,
i.e. 1,350 euros vs. 1,490 euros (L1/L0 cutoffs), 540 vs. 610 euros (L6/L5 to
L2/L1 cutoffs) and amounts close to zero on both sides of the L0/No grant
cutoffs.25 We now examine how these differences affect college enrollment, per-
sistence and degree completion rates.
5.1.2 Impact on College Enrollment
To what extent does the eligibility to a need-based grant affect applicants’
decision to enroll or to re-enroll in college? To answer this question, we first
consider the full sample of applicants, irrespective of their level of study. This
sample thus includes college entrants and applicants already enrolled in higher
education.
Figure 5 plots for each treatment sample the college enrollment (or re-
enrollment) rates of applicants against their relative income-distance to the
eligibility thresholds. The solid lines are the fitted values from a third-order
split polynomial approximation. Although the enrollment rates of applicants
appear relatively similar across the different samples (between 75 and 80 per-
cent), the three treatments considered have strikingly different effects on ap-
plicants’ enrollment decisions. Enrollment rates are unaffected by fee waivers
(graph 5a) but exhibit a clear jump when students become eligible for an an-
25Most of the observed discrepancy between the actual and predicted differences in the
average amount of allowance awarded is driven by the fact that approximately 10 percent
of applications were turned down by the student service agency for the reasons mentioned
above.
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nual cash allowance of 1,500 euros (graph 5b). The impact on enrollment rates
of subsequent 600 euros increments in the amount of financial aid (graph 5c)
is slightly positive but of smaller magnitude.
The RD estimates reported in Table 6 confirm the graphical evidence. They
show that applicants’ enrollment decisions are affected by the cash allowance
component of the need-based grants but not by the fee waiver component.
The baseline estimates (Panel A of table 6) are remarkably stable across spec-
ifications and suggest that fee waiver eligibility has no significant impact on
college enrollment (columns 2 and 3), which is not entirely surprising given
the small amounts involved. In contrast, being eligible for a cash allowance
of 1,500 euros increases applicants’ enrollment rate by 2.7 to 2.8 percentage
points (columns 5 and 6), the estimates being significant at the 1 percent level.
Subsequent 600 euros increments in the amount of cash allowance for higher
levels of grants are estimated to have a small positive impact on enrollment
rates of approximately 0.7 percentage point, but the effect is only significant
at the 10 percent level (columns 8 and 9) in the non-parametric specification.
We investigate the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the polynomial
order in the parametric model and to the choice of the bandwidth in the non-
parametric model. We find that using a quadratic or a quartic polynomial
function instead of a cubic to control for the distance to the income thresholds
in the parametric specification does not affect the results (columns 2, 5 and
8 in panel B of Table 6). We further show that changing the bandwidth size
to half or twice the value of the optimal bandwidth26 in the non-parametric
specification yields results that are very similar to those obtained using the
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) bandwidth selection algorithm.
To test for jumps at non-discontinuity points, we run a series of placebo
regressions in which the income thresholds are artificially set at the midpoints
between the true eligibility thresholds (panel C of table 6). Since these mid-
26If the value of twice the optimal bandwidth exceeds the maximum allowable bandwidth
(which was set to avoid including adjacent income cutoffs), we use the maximum bandwidth
instead.
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points do not correspond to any change in applicants’ grant eligibility status,
we should expect to find no significant jumps in enrollment rates at the placebo
thresholds. The points estimates are indeed close to zero and non-significant
in all specifications.
Our final robustness check addresses the possibility that our estimates could
not fully capture the impact of grant eligibility on higher education enrollment
decisions. In the absence of information on students enrolled in selective higher
education institutions in 2008 and 2009, we restricted our sample to appli-
cants who only listed university degree programs among their pre-registration
choices. The purpose of this restriction was to minimize the risk of misclas-
sifying applicants who do not appear in the SISE data as not being enrolled
in higher education. This type of misclassification would represent a threat to
our estimation strategy if a non-negligible share of applicants in our samples
ended up enrolling in selective institutions and changed their behavior at the
eligibility thresholds. The availability of supplementary data on the universe
of undergraduate students enrolled in selective higher education institutions
for the academic year 2010-2011 allows us to address this issue for prospective
undergraduate students who applied for a grant in 2010. The bottom panel
of table 6 shows that the fraction of undergraduate applicants who only listed
university degree programs among their pre-registration choices but ended up
being enrolled in other higher education institutions is very small (less than
1 percent). Moreover, the regression results show no evidence of significant
discontinuities in the probability of attending such institutions at the various
income eligibility thresholds. We are therefore confident that our baseline es-
timates capture the full impact of grant eligibility on applicants’ enrollment in
higher education.
To investigate potential heterogeneity in the college enrollment effects of
need-based grants, we run separate regressions for different subgroups of ap-
plicants, based on the year in which they applied, their gender, their level of
studies and their academic ability. The results from this heterogeneity analy-
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sis are reported in Table 7. The enrollment effects of the three treatments of
interest appear relatively stable across the different years of data (Panel B),
which indicates that our results are not driven by a single round of applications.
While fee waivers and incremental changes in the amount of allowance are not
associated with noticeable discontinuities in the enrollment rates by subgroup,
some differences arise when we consider the impact of qualifying for a condi-
tional cash allowance of 1,500 euros. A comparison of the point estimates by
gender (Panel C) would suggest that being eligible for such an allowance has
a larger enrollment effect for males than for females. The difference, however,
is not statistically significant. The subgroup analysis provides clearer evidence
that the enrollment effects of level 1 grants are larger for applicants entering
undergraduate or graduate degree programs (which correspond to the first and
fourth levels of study, respectively) than for continuing students. The esti-
mates reported in Panel D of Table 7 are about twice as large for the first and
fourth level of study (4.1 to 4.3 percentage points) as they are for the other
levels of study (1.7 to 2.3 percentage points), the difference being significant at
the 10 percent level when we consider the non-parametric estimates for under-
graduate applicants. These results suggest that the decision to enter university
or to pursue graduate studies is more heavily influenced by the provision of
financial aid than the decision to proceed to the second or third year of a given
degree program.
To investigate whether the impact of grant eligibility on college enrollment
varies across levels of academic ability, we divided our samples into four groups
based on applicants’ percentile rank on the Baccalaure´at exam27 (Panel E of
table 7). Our results indicate that being eligible for a 1,500 euros cash allowance
has a positive and significant impact on college enrollment throughout the
distribution of academic ability. The point estimates suggest, however, that
the enrollment effect of the allowance decreases with ability. Although not
27To control for the fact that average academic ability tends to rise as we consider appli-
cants who are more advanced in their studies, we computed the quartiles separately for each
year of application and level of study.
25
statistically different, the estimates are twice as large for students in the bottom
quartile of the ability distribution (3.4 to 3.6 percentage points) as they are for
students in the top quartile (1.7 to 1.8 percentage point). The fact that the cash
allowance component of the BCS program seems to have the largest impact on
the weakest students raises the question of its effects beyond enrollment. In the
next sections, we address this issue by examining the impact of eligibility for a
1,500 euros grant on persistence and degree completion rates. For the sake of
brevity, the results for fee waivers and for incremental changes in the amount of
allowance are not reported, as we find no evidence of significant discontinuities
at these cutoffs.28
5.1.3 Impact on Student Persistence
To study the impact of financial aid on persistence, we focus on students who
applied for a grant to enter an undergraduate or a graduate degree program
and follow their progress through college. Our data allow us to track 2008
applicants for up to three years after their application, and 2009 applicants for
up to two years.
Figure 6 shows that the college enrollment effect of being eligible for a
1,500 euros allowance is not short-lived, since differences in initial enrollment
rates at the L1/L0 cutoffs are carried over to the following year. We investigate
more precisely the effect of financial aid on persistence in table 8, by looking
separately at undergraduate and graduate applicants, and by focusing on other
dimensions of persistence, such as promotion to the next year level and degree
completion rates.
The first three columns of the table report the estimated impact of financial
aid on persistence for first year undergraduates. For the sample of 2008 and
2009 applicants, eligibility for a 1,500 euros allowance is found to increase initial
enrollment rates by 4.7 to 4.9 percentage points (panel A), the effect being
significant and of similar magnitude in the following year (first line of panel B).
28Results are available upon request.
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To have a more complete picture of the progress of first-year applicants through
college, we analyze wether they proceed to the next year level as opposed
to repeating the first year or dropping out of college. Our results suggest
that financial aid has a positive and significant 3.2 to 3.7 percentage point
impact on the probability of being enrolled as a second-year student after one
year (second line of panel B) but the estimated impact of financial aid on the
probability of having obtained all first and second year credits after two years
of undergraduate studies is not statistically significant (third line of panel B).
The enrollment effect of being eligible for a 1,500 euros cash allowance is still
detectable for undergraduate students two years after their application, the
non-parametric estimate showing a marginally significant 4.4 percentage points
enrollment gap in 2010 for prospective undergraduate students who applied for
a grant in 2008 (first line of Panel C). However, we find no significant effects of
the grant on the probability of being enrolled in the third year level after two
years and on the probability of graduating on time (second and third lines of
Panel C). Overall, our estimates demonstrate a clear impact of financial aid on
student persistence for undergraduate applicants but show no significant effects
on on-time degree completion. These results should nevertheless be interpreted
with caution, since the lack of statistical significance for the effects after two
years could be due to the fact that they are estimated on a relatively small
sample (only applicants from the 2008 round of applications can be followed
over three years). Moreover, our data do not allow examining degree completion
effects beyond a three-year window.
Table 8 shows that the effects of financial aid on persistence are strong for
graduate applicants (columns 4 to 6). Students who applied for a grant in
2008 or 2009 to start a graduate degree program are not only more likely to
enroll in college if they are eligible for a 1,500 euros cash allowance (first line of
Panel A). They are also more likely to successfully complete all their first-year
credits (second line of panel A), to proceed to the next year level (first and
second lines of panel B) and to graduate on time (fourth line on panel B).
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The estimated effects on enrollment, promotion and graduation are of similar
magnitude, between 4 and 5 percentage points. These results suggest that the
cash allowance component of the BCS grant program is particularly effective
at the graduate level, as it increases not only enrollment and persistence, but
also degree graduation rates. The overall degree completion effect is likely to
be a mix of the grant’s effects on the “marginal” and “inframarginal” students,
whose respective contributions cannot be distinguished within our empirical
framework. Some of the students who would not have enrolled if they had not
been awarded a conditional cash allowance will have completed their degree
after joining the master’s program. In addition, the grant could allow students
who would have attended college irrespective of financial aid to study in better
conditions, thus increasing their chances of success.
5.1.4 Impact on Degree Completion
Figure 7 and Table 9 extend the analysis by showing the impact of financial aid
on students who applied for a grant before entering the final year of a degree
program, either the third year of a bachelor’s degree or the second year of a
master’s degree. The pooled estimates indicate (columns 8 and 9) that being
eligible for a cash allowance of 1,500 euros not only has a positive and significant
2 percentage point impact on the enrollment rates of final-year applicants but
also increases their chances of completing their degree by a similar order of
magnitude (about 3 percentage points). The effect are more precisely estimated
for the large sample of undergraduate applicants (columns 2 and 3) than for
the smaller sample of graduate applicants (columns 5 and 6). The fact that
low-income students who progressed to the final year of a degree program are
positively selected on achievement appears as a plausible explanation for why
the estimated degree completion effects of financial aid tend to be larger for
third-year undergraduate or second-year graduate students than for college
entrants.
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6 Conclusion and Discussion
Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide causal evidence on the ef-
fects of a large French need-based grant program on college enrollment, per-
sistence and degree completion for low-income students. Our results show a
significant impact of being eligible for a 1,500 euros cash allowance on enroll-
ment decisions, not only at college entry, but also at higher levels of study.
We further find evidence of a positive effect of financial aid on persistence in
college. Prospective first-year undergraduate applicants who qualify for the
cash allowance are not only more likely to start college, but also to re-enroll in
the following year and to progress to the next year level, although the effect
seems to fade out after two years. At the master’s level, the effects of financial
aid are found to be more persistent, as graduate applicants who are eligible
for a 1,500 euros cash allowance are both more likely to pursue graduate stud-
ies and to complete their master’s degree after two years. These finding are
consistent with the selection process occurring in French universities, where
admission is not competitive but where the weakest students tend to drop out
early. Our estimates suggest that the academic prospects of first-year under-
graduates who start college as a result of being awarded a grant are similar to
those of other college entrants, many of whom drop out along the way. But as
students progress through college, only the more able remain, and grants ap-
pear particularly effective in subsidizing low-income students who have reached
these higher levels of study. Consistent with this interpretation, we also find
positive effects on degree completion for prospective final year undergraduate
and graduate students.
Simple back-of-the-envelope calculations can be performed to get some sense
of the program’s cost-effectiveness. Our estimates show that the provision of
1,500 euros cash allowances to prospective undergraduate or graduate students
increases their college enrollment rates by approximately 4.5 percentage points
from a baseline rate of 73 percent. The cost of inducing more students to
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enroll in higher education through the provision of such grants includes the
distribution of cash allowances to all eligible students, the financing of two
years of college education for students who are induced to enroll as a result of
the grant, and the earnings foregone by these students while attending college.
According to our computations, these costs would amount to approximately
105,000 euros per undergraduate student induced to attend college for two
years (without graduating), and 115,000 euros per graduate student induced
to complete a master’s degree.29 These costs are to be compared with the
benefits from college studies. In France, the annual differential in gross wages
plus taxes between high school graduates and individuals with some college
but no bachelor’s degree is around 13 percent. This relatively modest return
to some college could be partly driven by the small signaling value of the col-
lege admission process in France. The corresponding wage differential between
individuals holding a bachelor’s degree and individuals holding a master’s de-
gree is much higher, around 35 percent. Given these substantial returns to
a graduate degree, we estimate the net present discounted value of distribut-
ing cash allowances of 1,500 euros per student induced to attend college to be
much larger for graduate applicants (310,000 euros) than for undergraduate
applicants (40,000 euros). It would take approximately 15 years to balance
the costs and benefits of such grants for graduate applicants, as opposed to
30 years for undergraduates.
While these calculations suggest that the BCS grant program is cost-effective
for both college entrants and continuing students, they point out to larger net
social benefits at the graduate level. Improving the effectiveness of need-based
grant programs therefore requires identifying adequate policy responses to the
non-financial barriers – such as poor academic preparation and insufficient mon-
itoring – that could affect the ability of low-income college entrants to persist
to degree completion.
29See the online appendix for the details of the cost-benefit calculations.
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Figure 1: Income Eligibility Thresholds for the Different Levels of BCS Grant
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Notes: The figure shows the income eligibility thresholds for the different levels of grants (denoted L0 to L6)
awarded through the French Bourses sur crite`res sociaux program in 2009. The thresholds, which depend
on the applicant’s family need assessment (FNA) score, apply to parental taxable income earned two years
before the application (x-axis). The FNA score (y-axis) is capped at 17 and has a median value of 3. Income
thresholds are expressed in 2011 euros.
Figure 2: Amount of Annual Cash Allowance Awarded to Applicants with an
FNA Score of 3 Points, as Function of their Parents’ Taxable Income
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Notes: The figure shows the amount of annual cash allowance awarded in 2009 to BCS grant applicants with a
family needs assessment (FNA) score of 3 points (median value), as a function of their parents’ taxable income
two years before the application. Applicants eligible for a level 0 grant qualify for fee waivers only. Applicants
eligible for higher levels of grant qualify for fee waivers and an annual cash allowance, the amount of which varies
with the level of grant: 1,476 euros (level 1), 2,223 euros (level 2), 2,849 euros (level 3), 3,473 euros (level 4),
3,988 euros (level 5) and 4,228 euros (level 6). Income thresholds and allowance amounts are expressed in 2011
euros.
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Figure 3: McCrary (2008) Test for Manipulation of the Assignment Variable
at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds
(a) Fee Waiver (L0/No Grant Cutoffs)
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(b) e1,500 Allowance (L1/L0 Cutoffs)
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(c) e600 Increment (L6/L5 to L2/L1 Cutoffs)
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Notes: The figure plots weighted kernel density estimates, performed separately on either side of income eligi-
bility thresholds. The “fee waiver” sample includes applicants whose parental income is close to the eligibility
thresholds between no grant and a level 0 grant (fee waiver only). The “1,500 euros allowance” sample includes
applicants in the vicinity of the income thresholds between level 0 and level 1 grants, where students (who
already qualify for the fee waiver) become eligible for an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros. The “600 euros
increment” sample includes applicants close to the income thresholds between consecutive levels of grant in the
level 2 to level 6 range, where the amount of annual cash allowance increases by 600 euros on average. The
x-axis is the relative distance between the applicant’s parental income and the income eligibility threshold. The
optimal bandwidth and bin size are obtained using the selection procedure proposed by McCrary (2008).
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Figure 4: Fraction of Applicants Awarded a Conditional Grant and Average
Amount of Allowance Awarded at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds
(a) Fee Waiver (L0/No Grant Cutoffs)
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(c) e600 Increment (L6/L5 to L2/L1 Cutoffs)
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Notes: The circles represent the average fraction of applicants who were awarded a conditional grant (left
panels) and the average amount of allowance awarded (right panels) per interval of relative income-distance
to the eligibility thresholds. The solid lines are the fitted values from a third-order polynomial approximation
which is estimated separately on both sides of the cutoffs. The vertical lines identify the eligibility cutoffs.
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Figure 5: College Enrollment Rate of Grant Applicants at Different Income
Eligibility Thresholds
(a) Fee Waiver (L0/No grant Cutoffs)
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(b) e1,500 Allowance (L1/L0 Cutoffs)
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(c) e600 Increment (L6/L5 to L2/L1 Cutoffs)
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Notes: The circles represent the mean college enrollment rate of grant applicants per interval of relative income-
distance to the eligibility thresholds. The solid lines are the fitted values from a third-order polynomial ap-
proximation which is estimated separately on both sides of the cutoffs. The vertical lines identify the eligibility
cutoffs.
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Figure 6: College Enrollment and Persistence Rates of First-Year Undergrad-
uate and Graduate Applicants at the 1,500 euros Allowance Eligibility Cutoff
(a) Enrolled in College in Current Year
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(b) Enrolled in College in Following Year
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Notes: The circles represent the mean college enrollment rate of first-year undergraduate or graduate applicants
in the year of application (left panel) and in the following year (right panel), per interval of relative income-
distance to the eligibility thresholds. The sample includes 2008 and 2009 applicants entering the first year of a
three-year bachelor’s degree or the first year of a two-year master’s degree. The solid lines are the fitted values
from a second-order polynomial approximation which is estimated separately on both sides of the cutoff. The
vertical lines identify the eligibility cutoffs.
Figure 7: College Enrollment and Degree Completion Rates of Final-Year
Undergraduate and Graduate Applicants at the 1,500 euros Allowance Eligibility
Cutoff
(a) Enrolled in College in Current Year
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(b) Completed Degree in Current Year
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Notes: The circles represent the mean college enrollment (left panel) and the degree completion rate (right panel)
of final year undergraduate or graduate applicants, per interval of relative income-distance to the eligibility
thresholds. The sample includes 2008 to 2010 applicants entering the final year of a three-year bachelor’s
degree or the final year of a two-year master’s degree. The solid lines are the fitted values from a second-order
polynomial approximation which is estimated separately on both sides of the cutoff. The vertical lines identify
the eligibility cutoffs.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Applicants to BCS Need-Based Grants at
Different Income Eligibility Thresholds (2008-2010)
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
(1) (2) (3)
Applicants:
Female .59 .60 .61
Age 20.5 20.6 20.9
(2.3) (2.1) (2.2)
Baccalaure´at Percentile Rank 61.2 59.3 56.5
(23.6) (23.6) (23.8)
Number of pre-Registration Choices 1.8 1.7 1.7
(1.1) (1.0) (1.0)
Applications:
Parents’ Taxable Income (Euros) 42,068 31,632 21,669
(9,066) (6,815) (6,469)
Family Needs Assessment Score 2.9 3.4 3.8
(2.3) (2.5) (2.8)
Number of Siblings 0.9 1.0 1.2
(.8) (.9) (1.1)
Distance to College (Km) 137 132 132
(229) (218) (230)
Applied for University Housing .37 .31 .32
Successful Housing Application .12 .13 .16
Level of Study:
First Year .28 .25 .25
Second Year .26 .28 .27
Third Year .22 .24 .24
Fourth Year .14 .14 .14
Fifth Year .11 .10 .10
Conditional Grant:
Awarded a Conditional Grant .70 .92 .92
Amount of Cash Allowance Awarded (Euros) 2 819 2,642
(64) (746) (1,114)
Final grant:
Receives Grant .51 .70 .70
Amount of Cash Allowance Received (Euros) 13 658 2,014
(202) (759) (1480)
College Enrollment:
Enrolled in College .79 .80 .78
N 96,390 194,513 284,601
Notes: The samples are constructed from the AGLAE administrative dataset, which covers the universe of applicants to need-based grants awarded
through the French Bourses sur crite`res sociaux program for the period 2008 to 2010. Only applicants who listed university degree programs in each of
their pre-registration choices, who submitted their application before July and whose FNA score does not vary across pre-registration choices are included.
The “fee waiver” treatment sample (column 1) includes applicants whose parental income is within ±20 percent of the eligibility thresholds between no
grant and a level 0 grant (which consists of a fee waiver). The “1,500 euros allowance” sample (column 2) includes applicants whose parental income is
within ±16 percent of the income thresholds between level 0 and level 1 grants, where students (who already qualify for the fee waiver) become eligible for
an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros. The “600 euros increment” sample (column 3) includes applicants whose parental income is within ±6 percent of
the income thresholds between consecutive levels of grant in the level 2 to level 6 range, where the amount of annual cash allowance increases by 600 euros
on average. The applicants’ percentile rank on the Baccalaure´at high school graduation exam was retrieved from the OCEAN dataset covering the period
2003 to 2010. Information on college enrollment comes from the SISE dataset which includes all students registered in a French public university in
academic years 2008-2009 through 2010-2011. All amounts are expressed in 2011 euros. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2: McCrary (2008) Test for Manipulation of the Assignment Variable at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Year of Application: 2008 to 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 to 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 to 2010 2008 2009 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log Difference in Frequency Bins -.022 -.031 -.003 .022 -.000 -.021 .000 .002 .009 .022 .004 .002
(.027) (.059) (.053) (.044) (.018) (.034) (.028) (.028) (.016) (.027) (.029) (.026)
Z-stat .81 .54 .06 .48 .01 .61 .00 .08 .59 .84 .15 .07
Bandwidth .0788 .0700 .0574 .0707 .0535 .0462 .0630 .0577 .0167 .0181 .0154 .0172
Bin Size .0006 .0014 .0011 .0010 .0004 .0007 .0007 .0007 .0001 .0002 .0002 .0002
N 96,390 22,428 34,214 39,748 194,513 58,329 65,607 70,577 284,601 90,968 94,683 98,950
Notes: The McCrary test is performed separately for each treatment sample. The “fee waiver” sample (column 1) includes grant applicants whose parental income is close to the eligibility thresholds between no grant
and a level 0 grant (which consists of a fee waiver). The “1,500 euros allowance” sample (column 2) includes applicants in the vicinity of the income thresholds between level 0 and level 1 grants, where students (who
already qualify for the fee waiver) become eligible for an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros. The “600 euros increment” sample (column 3) include applicants close to the income thresholds between consecutive levels
of grant in the level 2 to level 6 range, where the amount of annual cash allowance increases by 600 euros on average. The test is performed using all available years (2008 to 2010) and for each year separately. The
assignment variable is defined as the relative distance between an applicant’s parental income and the income threshold that determines eligibility to the level of grant considered (this threshold being a function of the
applicant’s family needs assessment score). The table rows show the estimated discontinuity in the density function of the assignment variable at the threshold, its standard error (in parenthesis), the associated z-statistic,
the estimated optimal bandwidth, bin size and the number of observations. The optimal bandwidth and bin size are obtained using the selection procedure proposed by McCrary (2008). Z-test values lower than 1.64
suggest no statistical evidence of a discontinuity in the density of the assignment variable at the income eligibility thresholds.
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Table 3: Balance of Applicants’ Baseline Characteristics in the Year of Application, at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds
(2008-2010 Applicants)
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Each Baseline Characteristic Separately
Male .401 -.006 .005 .406 .000 -.002 .392 .009 .005
(.015) (.011) (.009) (.006) (.007) (.005)
96,390 41,618 194,513 141,024 284,601 172,909
Age 20.49 .05 .03 20.62 .06* .04 20.84 .04 .02
(.07) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.02)
96,390 70,883 194,513 108,817 254,720 197,075
Baccalaure´at Percentile Rank 61.18 -.23 -.04 60.02 .07 0.01 56.70 .48 .14
(.74) (.47) (.45) (.24) (.38) (.30)
89,139 61,174 178,151 178,151 284,601 121,812
Number of pre-Registration Choices 1.89 -.08** -.07*** 1.71 .01 .01 1.72 .01 -.00
(.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01)
96,390 80,517 194,513 98,595 284,601 178,202
Parents’ Taxable Income (Euros) 48,115 -96 66 34,208 9 48 22,238 10 86*
(261) (217) (118) (93) (96) (52)
96,390 33,379 194,513 93,392 284,601 284,601
Family Needs Assessment Score 2.58 -.03 .02 3.21 .00 .02 3.75 .01 .03
(.07) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.03)
96,390 31,921 194,513 90,340 284,601 221,654
Applied for University Housing .429 -.017 -.016 .319 .002 -.000 .315 -.007 -.001
(.015) (.010) (.009) (.006) (.007) (.004)
96,390 63,682 194,513 112,060 284,601 272,276
Successful Housing Application .114 .007 .009 .123 .002 .003 .158 -.003 -.001
(.010) (.006) (.006) (.004) (.006) (.003)
96,390 61,252 194,513 124,692 284,601 260,070
B. All Baseline Characteristics Jointly
χ2-stat 10.95 3.21 6.77
P-value .204 .920 .561
Notes: The table shows parametric and non-parametric regression discontinuity estimates to assess the difference in the value of applicants’ baseline characteristics at the income eligibility thresholds between different levels of
grant. Panel A evaluates separately whether each baseline characteristic is balanced. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression, where the running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility
threshold. The window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.20 for the L0/No Grant cutoffs, ±0.16 for the L1/L0 cutoffs and ±0.06 for the L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs. Columns 1, 4 and 7 report the mean value of the
dependent variable above the income eligibility thresholds. The parametric specifications include a cubic function of the running variable, which is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs. Non-parametric estimates use the
edge kernel, with bandwidth computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes for
each outcome are reported below the standard errors. Panel B tests whether the baseline characteristics are jointly balanced by i) estimating a system of seemingly unrelated regressions where each equation represents a different
baseline covariate and includes a cubic function of the running variable, which is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs and ii) performing a χ2 test for the discontinuity gaps in all equations being zero. All amounts are
expressed in 2011 euros. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 4: Balance of Applicants’ Baseline Characteristics in the Year Preceding the Application, at Different Income Eligibility
Thresholds (2009 and 2010 Applicants)
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Each Baseline Characteristic Separately (2009 and 2010 Applicants)
Applied for a Grant in Previous Year .402 -.005 .008 .638 .002 -.003 .708 -.002 .000
(.017) (.009) (.010) (.007) (.008) (.005)
73,962 73,962 136,184 83,512 193,633 152,448
Parents’ Taxable Income in Previous Application (Euros) 41,677 101 350 32,651 96 98 21,930 -252 -177
(668) (414) (233) (151) (176) (154)
36,601 29,079 87,172 62,371 133,196 51,403
Family Needs Assessment Score in Previous Application 3.29 -.04 -.03 3.41 .02 .01 3.81 .05 .01
(.13) (.09) (.07) (.05) (.06) (.04)
36,601 15,530 87,172 43,836 133,196 91,980
Amount of Grant Received in Previous Year (Euro) 112 -15 5 463 -4 12 1,722 30 10
(20) (13) (21) (17) (29) (18)
73,962 46,852 136,184 58,430 193,633 160,971
Enrolled in College in Previous Year .652 -.014 -.001 .723 .006 -.003 .721 .002 .002
(.016) (.011) (.010) (.006) (.008) (.006)
73,962 39,191 136,184 101,659 193,633 106,694
B. All Baseline Characteristics Jointly (For Repeated Applications)
χ2-stat 1.10 0.54 4.26
P-value .894 .970 .372
Notes: The table shows parametric and non-parametric regression discontinuity estimates to assess the difference in the value of the baseline characteristics of applicants (in the year preceding their application) at the current year income eligibility thresholds.
The sample is restricted to 2009 and 2010 applicants since we have no previous year information for 2008 applicants. Panel A evaluates separately whether each baseline characteristic is balanced. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression where the
running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility threshold. The window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.20 for the L0/No Grant cutoffs, ±0.16 for the L1/L0 cutoffs and ±0.06 for the L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs.
Columns 1, 4 and 7 report the mean value of the dependent variable above the income eligibility thresholds. The parametric specifications include a cubic function of the running variable, which is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs. Non-parametric
estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidth computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes for each
outcome are reported below the standard errors. Panel B tests whether the baseline characteristics in the preceding year (for repeated applications only) are jointly balanced by i) estimating a system of seemingly unrelated regressions where each equation
represents a different baseline covariate and includes a cubic function of the running variable, which is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs and ii) performing a χ2 test for the discontinuity gaps in all equations being zero. All amounts are expressed
in 2011 euros. All amounts are expressed in 2011 euros. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 5: Discontinuities in Conditional Grants Awarded to Applicants at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Awarded a Conditional Grant .001 .858*** .861*** .915 .003 .002 .922 -.004 -.002
(.007) (.006) (.005) (.003) (.004) (.004)
96,390 30,967 194,513 145,971 284,601 97,570
Predicted Amount of Cash Allowance (Euros) 0 0 0 0 1,493*** 1,494*** 2,575 614*** 606***
(0) (0) (0) (0) (12) (7)
96,390 96,390 194,513 127,855 284,601 210,522
Actual Amount of Cash Allowance (Euros) 0 2 1 7 1,347*** 1,342*** 2,386 537*** 543***
(2) (1) (6) (6) (16) (13)
96,390 96,390 194,513 54,579 284,601 127,904
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuities in the grants awarded to applicants at the different income eligibility thresholds, along three dimensions: i) the fraction of applicants who are awarded a conditional grant, ii) the amount
of cash allowance predicted by the grant eligibility formula and iii) the actual amount of allowance awarded by the student service agency. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression where the running variable is the applicant’s relative
income-distance to the eligibility thresholds. The window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.20 for the L0/No Grant cutoffs, ±0.16 for the L1/L0 cutoffs and ±0.06 for the L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs. Columns 1, 4 and 7 report
the mean value of the dependent variable above the income eligibility thresholds. The parametric specifications include a cubic function of the running variable, which is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs. Non-parametric estimates
use the edge kernel, with bandwidth computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes for each
outcome are reported below the standard errors. All amounts are expressed in 2011 euros. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 6: Discontinuities in College Enrollment Rates at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Polynomial Order Bandwidth Size Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric
(Parametric (Non-parametric Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates
estimates) estimates) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Baseline Estimates (2008-1010 Applicants)
Enrolled in College 3 Optimal .773 .000 .003 .786 .028*** .027*** .775 .006 .007*
(.013) (.009) (.007) (.004) (.006) (.004)
96,390 50,388 194,513 194,513 284,601 203,752
B. Sensitivity Analysis (2008-1010 Applicants)
Enrolled in College 2 Half .773 .002 .006 .786 .027*** .027*** .775 .006 .008
(.009) (.013) (.006) (.005) (.005) (.006)
96,390 22,387 194,513 121,582 284,601 101,831
Enrolled in College 4 Twice .773 .017 .004 .786 .025*** .027*** .775 .010 .008**
(.016) (.007) (.009) (.004) (.008) (.003)
96,390 84,872 194,513 194,513 284,601 284,601
C. Placebo Regressions at Midpoints Between Income Eligibility Thresholds (2008-1010 Applicants)
Enrolled in College 3 Optimal .786 -.005 -.003 .796 -.001 -.001 .777 -.001 -.001
(.013) (.010) (.009) (.007) (.006) (.004)
61,761 34,783 131,492 64,291 325,304 226,696
D. Enrolled in other Higher Education Institutions (2010 Undergraduate Applicants)
Enrolled in Other Higher Education Institutions 3 Optimal .010 -.001 .001 .007 .001 .002 .006 .002 .001
(.005) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.002)
29,774 13,401 53,215 23,584 74,625 44,041
Notes: Panel A reports the estimated discontinuities in the college enrollment rates of grant applicants at the different income eligibility thresholds. Panel B evaluates the robustness of the baseline estimates to varying the order of the polynomial approximation in the parametric specification (using
second and fourth-order polynomials) and to the choice of bandwidth in the non-parametric specification (setting the bandwidth to half and twice the size of the optimal bandwidth). The window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.20 for the L0/No Grant cutoffs, ±0.16 for the
L1/L0 cutoffs and ±0.06 for the L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs. Panel C shows the results of placebo regressions in which the income thresholds are artificially set at the midpoints between the actual eligibility thresholds. Panel D reports the estimated discontinuities in the probability of being enrolled
in higher education institutions other than public universities (for 2010 undergraduate applicants only). Each coefficient comes from a separate regression where the running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility threshold. Columns 1, 4 and 7 report the mean value of
the dependent variable above the income eligibility thresholds. The parametric specifications include a polynomial function of the running variable, which is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs. Non-parametric estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidth computed following Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and treatment sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes are reported below the standard errors. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 7: Discontinuities in College Enrollment Rates at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds, by Subgroup of Applicants
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Baseline Estimates
Full Sample .773 .000 .003 .786 .028*** .027*** .775 .006 .007*
(.013) (.009) (.007) (.004) (.006) (.004)
96,390 50,388 194,513 194,513 284,601 203,752
B. By Year of Application
2008 Applicants .753 .016 .002 .780 .030*** .033*** .769 .008 .009
(.020) (.015) (.010) (.009) (.008) (.006)
22,428 19,617 58,329 37,632 90,968 90,968
2009 Applicants .782 -.003 .002 .788 .027*** .025*** .777 .010 .012*
(.016) (.013) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.006)
34,214 22,440 65,607 46,498 94,683 86,853
2010 Applicants .778 -.001 -.001 .789 .024** .025*** .778 .001 .003
(.015) (.013) (.009) (.008) (.008) (.007)
39,748 22,896 70,577 45,843 98,950 66,225
C. By Gender
Females .768 .009 .012 .788 .021*** .023*** .773 .002 .006
(.012) (.009) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.005)
57,148 57,148 115,822 101,214 173,510 114,441
Males .780 -.008 -.006 .782 .036*** .034*** .778 .011 .010
(.015) (.014) (.009) (.007) (.007) (.007)
39,242 20,723 78,691 72,625 111,091 65,572
Notes: Table continued on next page.
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Table 7 (Continued): Discontinuities in College Enrollment Rates at Different Income Eligibility Thresholds, by Subgroup of
Applicants
Treatment Sample: Fee Waiver e1,500 Allowance e600 Increment
(Income Eligibility Thresholds) (L0/No Grant) (L1/L0) (L6/L5 to L2/L1)
Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
D. By Level of Study
First Year .761 -.002 -.001 .755 .041*** .043*** .740 .008 .007
(.018) (.016) (.012) (.008) (.010) (.010)
26,664 15,410 48,116 48,116 71,404 38,508
Second Year .855 .015 .008 .835 .017* .021*** .841 .011 .013*
(.016) (.014) (.010) (.008) (.008) (.007)
25,028 15,915 53,759 42,530 78,019 48,987
Third Year .742 -.004 .005 .795 .023** .021** .771 .005 .006
(.021) (.018) (.011) (.010) (.010) (.007)
21,211 13,695 45,780 34,261 67,304 64,666
Fourth Year .711 .001 -.010 .741 .041** .042*** .731 -.002 -.001
(.028) (.023) (.016) (.016) (.014) (.012)
13,283 9,897 26,498 15,686 38,618 25,360
Fifth Year .750 -.004 .004 .776 .019 .017 .749 -.007 -.003
(.030) (.027) (.018) (.017) (.015) (.012)
10,204 6,003 20,360 12,198 29,256 27,217
E. By Baccalaure´at Percentile Rank
First Quartile .740 .004 -.002 .748 .036*** .034*** .746 .007 .005
(.023) (.018) (.013) (.011) (.010) (.009)
17,642 15,289 39,019 30,590 64,224 40,410
Second Quartile .767 -.026 -.012 .791 .036*** .040*** .783 .004 .008
(.020) (.020) (.012) (.011) (.010) (.008)
20,544 9,618 42,921 24,575 64,605 57,387
Third Quartile .803 .010 .004 .813 .028*** .030*** .814 .008 .006
(.018) (.014) (.011) (.008) (.009) (.007)
23,035 19,729 46,421 43,141 63,898 63,898
Fourth Quartile .835 .006 -.000 .847 .017* .018* .843 .010 .011
(.016) (.015) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.007)
27,918 14,118 49,790 28,238 61,993 58,000
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuities in the college enrollment rates of several subgroups of grant applicants, at different income eligibility thresholds. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression where
the running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility threshold. The window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.20 for the L0/No Grant cutoffs, ±0.16 for the L1/L0 cutoffs and
±0.06 for the L6/L5 to L2/L1 cutoffs. Columns 1, 4 and 7 report the mean value of the dependent variable above the cutoffs. Quartiles of Baccalaure´at percentile rank are computed separately for each year of application and
level of study. The parametric specifications include a third-order polynomial (full sample) or a quadratic function (subgroups) of the running variable, which is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs. Non-parametric
estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidths computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. Sample sizes for each outcome are reported below the standard errors. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 8: Discontinuities in College Enrollment and Student Persistence Rates at the 1,500 euros Allowance Eligibility Cutoff,
First-Year Undergraduate and Graduate Applicants
Sample: First-Year Undergraduates (U) First-Year Graduates (G) All First-Year Applicants (U + G)
Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Outcome in Year t of Application (2008 and 2009 Applicants)
Enrolled in College in t .734 .047*** .049*** .733 .043** .037** .733 .045*** .041***
(.017) (.015) (.021) (.017) (.013) (.009)
23,672 16,467 16,883 14,071 40,555 40,555
Completed all First-Year Credits in t (G)
.468 .050** .047**
(.023) (.020)
16,883 12,372
B. Outcome in Year t+1 (2008 and 2009 Applicants)
Enrolled in College in t+1 .588 .045** .039*** .638 .045** .049** .609 .045*** .049***
(.020) (.014) (.023) (.021) (.015) (.015)
23,672 23,672 16,883 10,477 40,555 21,739
Enrolled in Second Year Level in t+1 .376 .032* .037** .429 .045* .046** .398 .037** .044***
(.019) (.017) (.023) (.018) (.015) (.014)
23,672 14,982 16,883 15,100 40,555 23,161
Completed First and Second Year Credits in t+1 (U) .239 .016 .022
(.017) (.015)
23,672 15,405
Obtained Master’s Degree in t+1 (G) .378 .046** .049**
(.023) (.022)
16,883 9,994
C. Outcome in Year t+2 for Undergraduate Students (2008 Applicants)
Enrolled in College in t+2 .509 .039 .044*
(.029) (.026)
10,951 7,437
Enrolled in Third Year Level in t+2 .302 .020 .019
(.026) (.021)
10,951 9,065
Obtained Bachelor’s Degree in t+2 .255 .018 .021
(.025) (.017)
10,951 10,951
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuities in the college enrollment and student persistence rates of applicants entering the first year of an undergraduate or graduate degree program, at the income eligibility thresholds between level 0 (fee
waivers only) and level 1 (fee waivers plus an annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros) grants. Each coefficient comes from a separate regression where the running variable is the applicant’s relative income-distance to the eligibility threshold. The window
size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.16. Columns 1, 4 and 7 report the mean value of the dependent variable above the income eligibility thresholds. The parametric specifications include a quadratic function of the running variable, which
is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs. Non-parametric estimates use the edge kernel, with bandwidths computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes for each outcome are reported below the standard errors. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
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Table 9: Discontinuities in College Enrollment and Degree Completion Rates at the 1,500 euros Allowance Eligibility Cutoff,
Final Year Undergraduate or Graduate Applicants
Sample: Final Year Undergraduates (U) Final Year Graduates (G) All Final Year Applicants (U + G)
Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric Baseline Parametric Non-Parametric
Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates Mean Estimates Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A.College Enrollment (2008 to 2010 Applicants)
College Enrollment in Graduation Year .795 .023** .021** .776 .019 .017 .789 .022** .019***
(.011) (.010) (.018) (.017) (.010) (.007)
45,780 34,261 20,360 12,198 66,140 66,140
B. Degree Completion (2008 to 2010 Applicants)
Degree Completion in Graduation Year .587 .031** .029*** .566 .035* .035* .580 .032*** .031***
(.014) (.011) (.021) (.019) (.012) (.009)
45,780 40,789 20,360 13,073 66,140 64,735
Notes: The table reports the estimated discontinuities in the college enrollment and degree completion rates of applicants entering the final year of an undergraduate or graduate degree program, at the income eligibility thresholds
between level 0 (fee waivers only) and level 1 (fee waivers and annual cash allowance of 1,500 euros) grants. The window size for the relative income-distance to cutoff is ±0.16. Columns 1, 4 and 7 report the mean value of the
dependent variable above the income eligibility thresholds. The parametric specifications include a quadratic function of the running variable, which is allowed to differ on either side of the cutoffs. Non-parametric estimates use the
edge kernel, with bandwidths computed following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Optimal bandwidths are computed separately for each outcome and sample. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes for
each outcome are reported below the standard errors. *: p<0.10; **: p<0.05; ***: p<0.01.
48
